Svātantra: The Idea of Freedom in the Pratyabhijñā Thought of Abhinavagupta

by

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B.A., St. John’s University, 2002

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts Department of Religious Studies 2006
This thesis entitled:
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Abstract

Chapter one explains fundamental concepts of Abhinavagupta’s thought, while giving an outline of Abhinavagupta’s Pratyabhijñā system. Chapter two provides a connection between Abhinava’s understanding of freedom and that of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. Chapter three shows how Abhinava’s understanding of freedom differentiates from the other systems. It is in the connection and acceptance of the ultimate validity of action, or agency, that the main difference arises. I attempt to show that in this connection to action, Abhinava’s idea of freedom, or svātantrya, is also connected to knowledge. Furthermore, it is because of svātantrya that Abhinava is able to explain how Śiva is able to create the world, and become the limited human being, all while not breaking up the fundamental non-dualism of the system.
Acknowledgements

The one person who helped on the actual thesis itself, without whom I could not have come close to completing this project, is Dr. Loriliai Biernacki. From helping me with translation work, to understanding the concepts, Dr. Biernacki gave me plenty of time, energy, encouragement, and patience. She helped me just about every step of the way, and I thank her. The other person who worked directly on the thesis with me is Matthew Swoveland. Together we struggled through some of the difficult Sanskrit translations. Thanks to Adam Bratter for listening and encouragement. I would also like to give thanks to everybody else who had some positive influence on me in writing this thesis, especially my wife, Katie.
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Introduction

There is a theological notion that contains a comical undertone, and yet its validity within many religious realms is simply dismissed. Is it possible for God to create a rock that is so heavy that even He cannot move it? So often, this question is dismissed it seems, because for one, the mind cannot completely wrap itself around the question. Another reason, though, is because no matter if the answer is “yes” or “no,” it seems to limit the abilities or power of God. Furthermore, this question seems to simply be a logical impossibility.

Abhinavagupta’s form of *pratyabhijñā* philosophy/theology answers this question, however, with a resounding “yes!” How can Abhinava claim this? After all, is he not claiming that God’s power and abilities are limited, even if they are only limited by Himself, or at least compared to Himself? The answer to this question is actually “yes” as well. How can this be compatible with an omnipotent Śiva? This paper is partly an endeavor to address these types of questions, as they apply to the *pratyabhijñā* philosophy of Abhinavagupta. And in this effort, it will be revealed that the freedom, or svātantra, of the Highest Lord (*parāmeśvara*) is an integral aspect in understanding how this is possible. This then, is the heart of this thesis: an attempt to come to a developed understanding of the idea of svātantra within the context of Abhinava’s *pratyabhijñā* philosophy.

In exploring what svātantra is for Abhinava, it will be shown that it contains some important similarities with the traditions of Vedānta and Sāṃkhya.
This is expressed in the fact that all three categorize their specific concept of the absolute as being free from limitations and obstacles. However, for Abhinava, svātantrya still has many differences from the other traditions, most noticeably with its connection to action. Because of this, unlike a tradition like Vedānta, the ultimate principle is seen as having agency.

At the root of explaining how Śiva has agency, Abhinava articulates that consciousness (prakāśa), unlike for Vedānta, has the innate capacity for self-referral (vimarsa), and therefore self-consciousness. He identifies this aspect of Śiva as being that which allows Him to have complete svātantrya, which must include agency. Furthermore, because of action’s unified nature with knowledge, svātantrya also entails the power of knowledge. This investigation eventually leads to the understanding that Śiva, as explained by his svātantrya, is able to accomplish the impossible. It is this propensity for the impossible, then, due to the svātantrya of Śiva, that creation occurs, which can be defined as the self-limitation of the unlimited Lord. It is because of this svātantrya that Śiva is able to create a rock that even He cannot move, and this is most thoroughly expressed by the fact the Śiva is the limited and bound soul (the paśu).

Within the duration of this endeavor, there will be two primary texts of Abhinava’s used. One is the third section of the Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarsinī (IPVV), which is a commentary on the commentary by Utpaladeva on his own Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. The other text is the Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarsinī (IPV), which is a commentary on the actual Īsvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva.
When dealing with works like Abhinavagupta’s philosophy/theology, it is important to acknowledge their unique and peculiar nature. Abhinava’s writing is not meant to purely be used for intellectual inquiry and debate, although it does supply plenty of opportunity to do so. Harvey Alper, in his illuminating essay about the concept of \textit{prakāśa} in Abhinava’s thought, highlights this aspect of the writings. “For Abhinava metaphysical argument is no end in itself; the final arbiter of an argument’s success has to be not whether it compels agreement, but whether it induces an appropriate religious response.”\footnote{Harvey Alper, “Siva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness: the Spaciousness of an Artful Yogi,” \textit{Journal of Indian Philosophy} 7 (1979), 382.} This sense of priority subordinates the goal of a nice and tidy systematic and thoroughly logically consistent exposition. Alper, although thinking it is possible, is even ambivalent as to whether Abhinava articulates an actual system.\footnote{Alper, 383: “Does Abhinava have a system in the strict sense? I think so, though I am not certain.”} I would proffer the idea that because of Abhinava’s sense of priority, his style of writing can be confusing and seemingly contradictory at times because of several reasons, all which relate to the spiritual, intellectual, and religious context of the works.

First of all, these texts grew out of a context in which oral tradition carried great import. Of course, there are a number of reasons why this was the case, but prominent among them certainly is the importance of the role of the guru in these traditions. From initiation to spiritual guidance, the guru is often understood as a necessary aspect of being a disciple within Kaśmir Saivism. One cannot get this, obviously, from a text. According to Douglas Brooks, “in every case, the
presence of the living guru is assumed to be the final arbiter of tradition.”

Therefore, according to Brooks, one is dependent on the guru in order to properly understand the meaning of Kasmir Saivaite texts. In essence, in order to preserve, protect, and to assure the greatest level of accuracy in interpretation, the texts are seen by many to be intertwined with the guidance of a living teacher. Without the proper teacher, there may be aspects of the text that remain in the dark for the reader, or worse, wrongly understood.

It also seems that Abhinava writes in such a way that he purposely confuses the reader. This is rather easily facilitated by that fact that Abhinava does not reject the “every-day” experiences of human beings. He accepts that they are real. He does want to change our understanding of them, though, based on his understanding of reality. In this process, the reader may actually have to accept, at least hypothetically, Abhinava’s recontextualizing of every-day life. This is not easy for the reader. What this serves as a testament to is the great difficulty of restructuring the way an individual imagines and experiences reality. With Abhinava, much of this reorientation deals with helping the reader get past the dualistic way of thinking, which is fundamental to the state of being a bound individual, a paśu. Because of this non-dual, but very dynamic worldview, one must be able to see things differently, in a way that overcomes isolationism and neat, tidy categories, as indicated by Alper: “One of the goals of his theology is, therefore, to demonstrate at one and the same time the diversity of connotation

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Abhinava’s style seems to suggest that the way he writes is actually part of the way for him to get people to see reality as it is.

Finally, as one might expect (which has been hinted at already), Abhinava’s writing is difficult because it attempts to capture the religious truths and experiences of his tradition. It is the claim by Paul Muller-Ortega, Kamalakar Mishra, Lakshman Jee, and even Abhinava that one cannot even understand the teachings fully unless that person has also experienced what the texts are talking about. Muller-Ortega is so adamant about this that it is worthwhile to quote him at length:

Moreover, as we shall see, the Kaula teachings are not so much a philosophy as they are a method for the attainment of enlightenment experiences. While one might wish to garner from initiation some insights to assist in deciphering difficult points of doctrine and obscure technical terms, in fact, the esotericism of the tradition does not actually lie so much with doctrine. Instead, the tradition’s esoteric nature relates to its discussion and description of nonordinary states of reality. Thus it is not appropriate to approach Abhinavagupta’s tantric formulations as one would approach a rational system…. Thus the tradition is esoteric in large measure because ultimately it is necessary to undergo the process of experiential replication before the symbols will speak to us completely. Abhinavagupta makes this precise point in stating that only when the lotus of the Heart has been opened by the “descent of energy” will the truth be revealed. Not even the most acute reasoning powers in the world could produce this revelation. Once the Heart has been “opened,” continues Abhinavagupta, discursive thought can penetrate ever more closely to the Ultimate.

With that being said, however, analyzing Abhinava’s writing within the scholarly context is not necessarily a fruitless endeavor. Abhinava did not mean for his writings to only be spiritual guidance for his disciples, because his writings

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4 Alper, 348
like the *IPVV* and the *IPV* include the literary form of refuting opposing traditions, like Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and Vaiśeṣika.

All three, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and Vaiśeṣika, are classical Indian traditions. Sāṃkhya is a dualistic tradition that reduces all of reality down to two essential entities: *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The goal within the tradition is to isolate the former (which is the Self’s true nature) from the latter. Vedānta, specifically Advaita Vedānta, teaches a monistic doctrine where the only reality is *Brahman*, and everything else relative to it is illusory, which includes the world. Vaiśeṣika is a pluralistic school of thought that understands the physical world to be made up of atoms.

It is through his intelligent and logical refutations, as is common within Indian philosophical texts, that Abhinava helps to define his own system. Therefore, Abhinava’s thought is not closed to scholarly analysis; it just limits the possible scope of that analysis.
Chapter 1:

Background of Abhinavagupta’s System

With the above caveats highlighted, let us move on to a brief excursion into the biography of Abhinava. We may not be able to paint a complete portrait of Abhinava’s life, but there is some useful information known. Abhinava was born in Kashmir sometime in the mid- to late-10th century.\(^6\) According to Jayaratha’s commentary on Abhinava’s Tantrāloka, he was a yoginībhū, or someone whose father is a siddha and mother is a yoginī.\(^7\) This lets us know that Abhinava was born into a pious family, and indeed, he grew up within the Saiva tradition. He became a voracious student of a multitude of traditions, to the point of actually studying under recognized masters of even competing traditions to his own.\(^8\) His abilities were undeniable. Eventually he became a master in his own right and administered to his own students, for whom much of his writing was meant.\(^9\) His scholarly acumen was of great renown, as even today, he is recognized as one of the great Indian thinkers and writers of philosophy, ritual, and ascetics. Despite this, his greatness is often times overlooked. Paul Muller-Ortega sees him as, “A figure who is perhaps second in importance and influence

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\(^6\) K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta: An Historical Philosophical Study (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakashan, 2000), 6. According to K.C. Pandey’s calculations based on Abhinava’s literary compositions, he was born between 950 and 960. This, at best, however is a rough estimate.


\(^8\) Pandey, 11-12.

\(^9\) Pandey, 26.
only to the great Śaṅkarācārya is barely mentioned in the standard surveys of Indian thought.”

Even more, though, he was recognized as a great spiritual being. His reputation grew to the point where, “he was recognized to be the spiritual head of all Saiva sects…. For this purpose there was a great congregation of great spiritualists, both male and female, in Kashmir.” Abhinavagupta also recognized this spiritual aspect of himself. “By the time he started to write his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī he had attained the state of jīvanmukta.” A jīvanmukta is one who has attained liberation, or mokṣa, in the body. In other words, throughout many traditions including Kāśmir Śaivism, an individual can become free from the cycle of rebirth and reach the highest religious goal while still living as a human being. “He himself says in the beginning of the above work [IPVV] that the present body is the last of his earthly existence.” What Abhinava implies in this claim is that he believed himself to have reached Śiva-realization, the goal in a Śaivaite’s life, but while still in the body. Allowing for liberation in the body was one way that the non-dual Śaiva traditions of Kāśmir asserted their superiority over their competitors, the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta tradition that only allowed for liberation after death. Therefore, Abhinava would no longer be reborn, and that was his last earthly body. Indeed, he was even recognized as an “incarnation of Śrikaṇṭha.”

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10 Muller-Ortega, 19.
11 Pandey, 20.
12 Pandey, 23.
13 Pandey, 23.
14 Pandey, 20. This is an epithet for Śiva.
This history of Abhinava refers back to what was said in the introduction about the great difficulty in reading and understanding what his writing means. Abhinava’s writing is not just for philosophical inquiry, but they were and are spiritual writings according to both the author and those members of the same tradition. He is still revered today as a philosopher and a spiritual figure.

From a philosophical standpoint, what is of the greatest importance in Abhinavagupta’s thought, and indeed, Kashmir Saivism as a whole, is the final syncretic product. The foundational ideas that make up the final product, however, have been primarily extracted from other traditions. “In one sense there is nothing new in the Saivism of Kasmir at all. One could argue that in it no fundamental innovation appears, yet the arrangement of traditional elements is strikingly original.” In a way, Abhinava’s life as a sponge-like student mirrors the historical reality of these traditions and their syncretic nature. And just like the other traditions which surrounded Kashmir Saivism as it developed, Abhinava’s worldview implements and expands upon the cosmological framework formally instigated by Sāmkhya.

Now I will define some basic terms while giving a broad overview of Abhinava’s pratyabhijñā thought.

The Sāmkhya, as well as Abhinava’s, cosmological framework is based on a collection of tattvas. “Tattva” can be translated with a number of different words, including element, principle, archetype, or category. Essentially, they are

15 Alper, 347.
16 “His Tantrāloka is a living testimony of the great zeal with which he pursued the study of the Āgamas and of the unparalleled proficiency which he acquired in them” (Pandey, 14).
understood as those general categories that make up all of creation (at least according to Sāmkhya). According to K.C. Pandey:

A Tattva is that which lasts through the ‘small dissolution’ of the universe and is always present in its effects, in its collocations, or in the beings marked by certain characteristics peculiar to itself. It is pervasive in so far as it forms the basis of all the collocations belonging to that creation, of which it is the chief constituent.¹⁷

The tattvas, then, form the template from which all of creation is made.

Abhinava’s philosophy, like other forms of Kaśmir Saivism, does include the twenty-five tattvas as articulated by the Sāmkhya. However, that does not mean the understanding of these twenty-five tattvas is the same for both.

For Sāmkhya, the two foundational tattvas are Puruṣa (Person, in the sense of soul) and Prakṛti (Nature). The ultimate goal is to isolate Puruṣa, the masculine element, from Prakṛti, which is understood as feminine. This separation and isolation is called kaivalya. Therefore, precedence is given to Puruṣa, and a spirit-matter dualism is created. Even though Abhinava accepts both categories, instead of accepted the schism between the two, he, to a certain degree, subordinates Puruṣa to Prakṛti:

[Etymologically defining the word Pradhāna, the primary, a synonym for Prakṛti],¹⁸ the prefix ‘pra’ indicates it is prathama, first, while the “dhā” means placed. The world is placed first in Nature, [not Puruṣa], in the

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¹⁷ Pandey, 357.
¹⁸ One may notice the extensive use of bracketing in Biernacki’s translation of the IPVV. It is used for a number of reasons including the following: filling in the blanks, so to speak, of implied words and phrases within the Sanskrit; pointing out relevant implications of the current statements; as well as, offering commentary or interpretations of difficult passages. Also significant is the fact that the IPVV is a commentary on a lost commentary, and so there is much to be added and explained.
Instead of being separate in quality, Puruṣa is actually seen rooted in Prakṛti.

This is confirmed in the following quote:

\[ \text{[the } \text{puruṣa]} \text{ is approached from the perspective of Nature and there its existence is from and in the world.}\]

This conflation has drastic ramifications on Abhinava’s understanding of the twenty-five tattvas, which will primarily be addressed later. For now, though, it is relevant to point out that Abhinava is denying the “ultimate” quality given to it by Sāṁkhya. Instead of it being the highest Subject, according to Abhinava, the Puruṣa is the limited soul connected to subjectivity that cannot separate from the binds of Prakṛti. Indeed, the Puruṣa is made up of Prakṛti, of nature, for it is entrenched within the framework of Prakṛti, and therefore, its existence is dependent upon it.

Combined with this placing of the nature of Puruṣa within the context of Prakṛti is the fact that, unlike Sāṁkhya, for Abhinava, Puruṣa is not seen as one of the highest tattvas. We will see eventually that, in fact, Puruṣa is within the realm of impure creation. Effectively, what Abhinava does is accept the highest

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20 IPVV, 312.
principle in Sāmkhya, but then places it into the impure realm and puts it in a subordinate position in relation to a number of other tattvas, much less the ultimate tattva, Śiva. Abhinava essentially demotes the Sāmkhya Puruṣa.

From this Puruṣa- Prakṛti foundation flow the final 23 tattvas, according to both Sāmkhya and Kasmīr Saivism. It may be worth pointing out that the tattvas are those principles that make up the pattern to be followed in the construction of all creation. Everything in creation is subsumed under one group or another, and each group has a corresponding tattva that pervades throughout all members of its group. For instance, the earth tattva pervades throughout all those objects that are defined by the earth tattva, such as a pot, a tree, etc. Some tattvas such as Prakṛti pervades throughout a much larger group, since it pervades all evolutes that extend from it, including the earth tattva. In this way, the cosmos is created and effectively categorized, from stars to mantras. We will now go through them.

The fact that Prakṛti is the basis for Puruṣa points to part of the essence of the Prakṛti tattva. Prakṛti is the root of all the rest of the twenty-three tattvas as espoused by Sāmkhya, meaning the other tattvas come from, or out of Prakṛti. This is related to the fact that in the order of manifestation, the grosser elements always are preceded by the more subtle.21 Furthermore, each subsequent tattva proceeds from the immediately preceding tattva, as well as Prakṛti.

21 IPVV, 304. The definition that the IPVV gives for “subtle” is not something that is small, “but rather a form which is devoid of constituent parts, has a very fine nature and with regard to the whole class of products, effects, has a form which is pervasive. The ‘gross’ should be considered to be the opposite of this” (IPVV, 296).
After Prakṛti and Puruṣa, then, comes the tattvas that make up the inner organ of the individual: buddhi (intellect), ahaṁkara (ego), and manas (mind). Following this group are the indriyas, both of knowledge (buddhīdriyas) and action (karmendriyas). Next come the tanmātras (subtle elements), and finally the mahābhūtas (the great, or gross, elements).

Starting in reverse order from the order of creation (or manifestation, arising from Prakṛti), the grossest tattvas are the mahābhūtas, which are five in total (again, starting from the grossest, to the most subtle of the mahābhūtas): earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These help to make up the material objects all around in the world.

The tanmātras are smell, taste, form, touch, and sound. “Tanmātras are subtle elements, and potential states that exist as the ground of the five gross elements.” There is a resemblance here to the forms of Plato.

More subtle than the tanmātras are the five karmendriyas, or organs of action: genitals, anus, feet, hands, and voice. One misunderstanding of the karmendriyas is that they are the actual physical organs of the body. Abhinava corrects this error:

The organs of action are especially designated and appointed to different parts of the body, and each perform their unique activities, but the functions themselves pervade the whole body. Therefore if the hand is broken, the two arms can also take things, and so on.

In other words, the karmendriyas really are the mode of action, as opposed to the physical body part, for those would be connected to the mahābhūtas.

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22 Hughes, 63.
23 Hughes, 301.
The *buddhindriyas* come next, and like the other groups, consists of five *tattvas* as well: nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear. These are the *tattvas* that gather knowledge from the world, but again, are not the actual physical organs.

While the *buddhindriyas* act as the means to perception, the *manas* (mind) sorts through and arranges the knowledge gathered through the senses. The second *tattva* within the inner organ is the *ahaṃkāra* (literally, the “I-maker”), which is responsible for forming the ego, which is the idea most people living in the world have of themselves, of who they are. Because of the *ahaṃkāra*, people have the impression “This is me, I am so-and-so.” The final *tattva* within the inner organ is the *buddhi*, or the intellect, which is involved in conceptual knowledge.

Unlike Sāṃkhya, however, Abhinava does not stop with just these twenty-five *tattvas*. Directly preceding *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are the five *kañcukas*, or covers. All five of them are *niyati*, *kāla*, *rāga*, *kalā*, and *vidyā*.

*Niyati* is sometimes translated as fate, and it is a restricting action upon the Subject (i.e. *Puruṣa*) as well as every object. “It is that power that limits the causal efficiency of every thing. It is because of this that fire only burns and the sesame sprout comes out of the sesame seed only.”

*Kāla* is the limitation of time, and may be compared to Kant’s idea of time, where the subject imposes upon the objective world time. Because of this,

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24 Sometimes, the *kañcukas* are known as six, then including *Māyā* with the other five.
25 Pandey, 375.
then, the subject sees the world through the “lens” of time. The normal human being has difficulty trying to imagine the world outside of the parameters of time, and this, according to Abhinava, is due to the covering काला.

Rागा is the covering translated as “attachment”. This तत्त्व includes both attachment and aversion, which often results in desire. It is demonstrated by the person, “who says, ‘let it be so, let this be mine.’”

The fourth and fifth coverings are:

kaला, the limitation of one’s capacity for action and विद्या, the limitation of one’s capacity to know.

It is because of the kaला and विद्या कान्चुकास that people can only do so much, and only know so much too.

As one can gather from the individual definitions, the covers are limitations on all objects and individual souls, thus the use of the word “cover.” They literally cover, or box in and limit. However, even though limitations, they also are what give what limited power each individual actually has:

Time and the limitations of action and so on, [the five sheaths] fill out the individuality of the subject, giving each individual its own nature.

We see here how Abhinava has already gone well beyond the conception of Purुṣा being the highest तत्त्व that Sāmkhya has. By subordinating the Purुṣा below even the कान्चुकास, Abhinava gives a strong critique of the Sāmkhya notion of the isolation (काविल्य) of Purुṣा.

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26 For Kant, the same thing applies for space as well. According to Swami Lakshman Jee, it is the नियती तत्त्व that encompasses the idea of the limitation of space.
27 IPVV, 291.
28 IPVV, 291.
29 IPVV, 294.
Directly preceding the kañcukas in the order of succession within the hierarchy of tattvas is Māyā. Māyā is also sometimes seen as a sixth kañcuka as well, for it is actually the root and foundation for them. Furthermore, Māyā is the foundation of the whole world, of every tattva articulated within the Sāmkhya system:

But having agreed with the Archetypes [in Patañjali’s doctrine] it is appropriate to designate them as Energies of Māyā. ³⁰

At this point, it is necessary to point out, in order to gain a broader appreciation of the essence of Māyā, that reality according to Abhinava is non-dual. It is not erroneous to say that within this tradition of Kasmir Śaivism, only Śīva exists, or is real. After exploring all the tattvas up to Māyā, it is a legitimate gripe to wonder how all this can be just one. Why speak of all these other tattvas then? Māyā is part of the answer to this question:

The Archetype of Māyā, is not accepted merely as the material cause in the body and as separate [from the Lord, as in the case in Sāmkhya with Prakṛti], but rather is considered as the inseparable Energy (Śakti) of the Supreme Lord. In fact the categories of earth and so on are only just forms of the Energy of the Supreme Lord. ³¹

In other words:

Hence in this way all beings have Śīva as their inherent nature, because without him they would lack any real inherent nature. ³²

This, then, is one of the absolute foundational truths about reality, according to Abhinavagupta.

³⁰ IPVV, 303.
³¹ IPVV, 270.
³² IPVV, 270.
However, the tattvas really do exist, and Māyā, in fact, serves as the beginning of the impure creation, as opposed to the pure creation. This means that everything from earth to Māyā makes up the impure creation. The reason why it is the impure and “lower” creation is because it is the realm of duality. “In the former the idea of unity predominates, but in the latter that of duality or plurality preponderates. This may be considered to be a typical point of distinction between the pure and the impure creations.”

The reason for the creation of this duality is, in fact, Māyā, for it is the principle of obscuration and limitation:

By nature [Māyā] only conceals.

It conceals the fact that reality is non-dual, and that is Śiva.

We have now completed the description of the impure creation with Māyā, even though hierarchically speaking, this part of creation actually begins with Māyā. For the description of the pure creation, we will start with the top of the hierarchy from the most subtle, and work our way down to the least subtle. At the top of the hierarchy of those tattvas in the pure creation is Śiva, the highest of all tattvas. Even more, Śiva is ultimately the only principle. The references in the IPVV to this truth are numerous:

he shows that everything is the Archetype of Śiva alone and this highest truth—Śiva—is the reality of all beings.

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33 Pandey, 370-371.
34 IPVV, 278.
35 IPVV, 256.
The Śiva Archetype alone is the [real] essence, the body of all entities.36

“On the wall [of the world which is itself Śiva] the shining of the picture of all beings”—This statement indicates the effort of the author to ascertain the nature of all these…. And the purport of the entire corpus of scriptures means to indicate that the Śiva Archetype alone is [all this].37

At this level, there is only pure subjectivity, and its nature is pure consciousness (cit). Here, the experience is simply “I,” it is described as pure and unadulterated “I-ness.”

Śakti tattva is understood as the energy of Śiva, and so really, is not different. In fact, often times one sees this fact indicated by the term Śiva-Śakti, to indicate one is not greater or even different than the other. For how can one separate the energy of Śiva from Śiva? Therefore, the impression here is still only “I.”

After Śiva-Śakti comes Sadāsiva, which is the next step lower, or “more gross” level. At this level, the world (“This”) is just starting to sprout, but in an indistinct manner. However, there definitely is the slight manifesting of “This,” so the experience is understood to be “I am this,” with the emphasis on the “I-ness.” Because of this indistinctness of the world at the level of Sadāsiva, it is connected with the action of withdrawal (of the world):

These elements [and Subjects and objects] resting in the state of Sadāsiva do have a slight portion of contact with “This-ness” [unlike in the state of Śiva where “This”-ness appears not at all]. This [incorporating a slight contact with “This-ness”] is in fact withdrawal and that is the state of Sadāsiva.38

36 IPVV, 257.
37 IPVV, 257
38 IPVV, 267.
Following Sadāśiva is Īśvara, where the world finally becomes distinct, meaning it is created but only in an internal sense, meaning within the subject. So it really is not separate from Sadāśiva, but maintains a definite emphasis on the “This,” and so the experience is “I am This.”

because the “This” state is not distinctly apprehended and named, the “I” carries the weight in the former state of Sadāśiva. On the level of Īśvara however, because the “this” is declared distinctly manifest, here “this” [is emphasized]…. To the extent that there is “This-ness” with the quality of clear distinct manifestation, it is said to be the level of Īśvara. And consequently [the power of lordship] shines [more] intensely, [more visibly in the state of Īśvara].

As Sadāśiva is related to withdrawal, Īśvara is connected to creation, or opening up.

The final tattva is Śuddhavidyā. At this level the “I” gets reemphasized, so the experience is “I am This.”

[This level is said to be pure] because [even though here in the Archetype of Pure Science, Śuddhavidyā] things have reached the level of object, of “thing” to be perceived, the state of “This”—[still] by examining and perceiving them accurately their real existence as awareness, as pure consciousness streams out.

The defining feature of the pure creation is that it is devoid of duality, whereas the impure entails that a duality exists, albeit only in the consciousness of those beings within the impure creation. The reason, then, that Śuddhavidyā is not an impure tattva is because there still is not a differentiation between the subject and the object. Instead:

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39 IPVV, 267.
40 IPVV, 273.
The ‘thing’ in its essential nature is the expanse of light (*prakāśa*).\(^{41}\)

This refers back to the previous quote used here, pointing out that despite their distinctness as objects, the true nature of the objects, as being consciousness, is affirmed and realized:

So perceiving this very notion—that what is “This-ness” is really in essence “I am This”—is what makes this state of Science pure.\(^{42}\)

Nevertheless, *Śuddhavidyā* is still acknowledged as inferior,\(^{43}\) and is the closest of the pure *tattvas* to the first impure *tattva* of *Māyā*. Yet its action is much different, as disclosed in the following verse:

The Energy of [pure – *Śuddhavidyā*] Science illuminates his real inherent nature of lordship for the one in a state of bondage. On the other hand, that which obscures is called *Māyā*.\(^{44}\)

Indeed, it is *Śuddhavidyā* that allows one to overcome the oppression of *Māyā* and break through from the impure creation to the pure creation, from duality to non-duality.

So [*Māyā*] is in fact different from the Energy, which is *vidyā*, Science, Wisdom, which illuminates one’s true form.\(^{45}\)

At the risk of overemphasizing the notion of non-duality, again, *Śiva* is the one, true reality of Abhinava’s philosophy/theology. There is no “other.” In any discussion of Abhinava’s philosophy, *Śiva* truly is the only subject! There being

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\(^{41}\) IPVV, 274.

\(^{42}\) IPVV, 274.

\(^{43}\) “because they are firmly rooted in a state of ‘This-ness’, they are inferior” (IPVV, 276).

\(^{44}\) IPVV, 277.

\(^{45}\) IPVV, 278.
only Śiva, Śiva is the creator, that which is created, and also the way that creation occurs. The one reality is pure consciousness (cit), and therefore, every tattva, every aspect of creation has at least a latent trace of consciousness in it. On this level of discussion, there is really nothing more to be said that could add to one’s understanding of the non-dual nature of Abhinava’s thought.

There is, however, much more to be said about Abhinava’s philosophy. Śiva is often spoken as having a two-fold nature:

Although the form of the conscious is in its highest reality the nature of the expanse of Light (prakāśa) and an Active Awareness….

Despite this two-fold nature, it is important to point out that the two-fold nature does not designate two different entities, nor does it even designate two different parts of a single entity. So an analogy such as “two sides of the same coin,” does not fit here. The analogy of a fire works much better.

In this analogy, prakāśa is the light, or the illuminating quality of a fire. Thus, Biernacki tends to translate it as “Light,” and Alper translates it as “illumination.” Like so many other terms, prakāśa can be translated with a plethora of English words, but without any single one necessarily encompassing the full meaning of the relevant term. Perhaps it is best if we would translate prakāśa as “shining, illuminating light”! For Śiva is self-shining (indeed it must be in order to be non-dual), just like fire. Śiva also illuminates objects, like fire (although a different dynamic is involved since Śiva actually is illuminating purely itself when “other” objects are illuminated). However, prakāśa’s essence

46 IPVV, 257.
as a shining, illuminating light is more than the normal understanding would be of light. Alper points out that, “while ultimately identical to the subject, to Śiva, to cit, as cosmogonic prakāśa serves as the impersonal prime ‘matter’ out of which and within which multiplicity is chiseled.” In other words, prakāśa serves as the conceptual matrix and material cause of creation. “In this sense prakāśa is structurally parallel to such notions as prakṛti in Sāṃkhya, and māyā in some sorts of Vedānta.”

Vimarsa, then, would necessarily serve as the efficient cause. It is important to mention, though, that ultimately, there is no difference between the efficient and material cause, for there is no difference between prakāśa and vimarsa. “Abhinava’s vision of the cosmic process as ultimate, just like the Vedāntin’s analysis of Brahman, tends to undercut any ultimate distinction between an efficient (nimatta) and a material (upādāna) cause.” Therefore, the material cause is the efficient cause. In other words, vimarsa is the aspect of Śiva connected with action. Just as the shining, illuminating fire is able to change its own form, and even the form of objects it comes in contact with, vimarsa is the aspect that indicates Śiva’s ability to actively create (albeit in His own image). It is a reflective awareness that includes agency. This is ratified by the following citations from the IPVV:

This is because of the mutual inseparability of jñāṇa, Knowledge and kriyā, Activity which have the respective natures of expansive Light and Active Awareness. And “that” alone is the highest ultimate nature of all entities. Because of this the Lord does have the freedom to manifest

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47 Alper, 376.
48 Alper, 398.
49 Alper, 365.
50 “Active Awareness” is how Biernacki translates vimarsa.
this expansion [which is the universe] and to perform all the five acts [of creation, maintenance, etc.] by means of accepting the power of kriyā, action. 

Action, which is really the nature of Active Awareness….”

This power of Śiva, action, which has as its nature vimarsa, points to the major difference between Abhinavan thought and Advaita Vedānta. Vedānta does admit the ultimacy of consciousness, but it denies it any self-consciousness and action. Therefore, the picture it paints is of a static Brahman (its absolute, the parallel of Śiva) as the only true reality. The question then becomes, “what created this world, even if it is illusion?” According to the Vedāntin, it is due to Māyā, but because Brahman does not have any agency, Māyā must either be the power of some other entity, or it is an independent power in its own right. Either way, according to the critics of Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is not only a depressing concept (for who wants the ultimate goal to not include action and self-consciousness), but also leads to a dualism, one of the things that is meant to be avoided.

Because of the agency of Śiva, however, Abhinava is able to explain the creation of the world without introducing another category or concept. Due to its power (sakti), Śiva creates the multiplicity of the universe, all of which can be categorized as ābhāṣas. Often times translated as “appearance”, or “manifestation”, ābhāṣas really do encompass everything in creation:

51 IPVV, 257.
52 IPVV, 261.
All that appears; all that forms the object of perception or conception; all that is within the reach of the external senses or the internal mind; all that we are conscious of when the senses and the mind cease to work, as in the state of trance or deep sleep; all that human consciousness, limited as it is, cannot ordinarily be conscious of and, therefore, is simply an object of self-realisation; in short all that is i.e. all that can be said to exist in any way and with regard to which the use of any kind of language is possible, be it the subject, the object, the means of knowledge or the knowledge itself, is Ābhāsa.\(^5\)

Some people, however, have not taken the proper “shining” toward the idea of ābhāsas, and even though they accept them as the nature of all creation, they tend to present them as an appearance in the sense of an image, copy, or replication of another object.\(^5\) There is the idea that ābhāsas, within Abhinava’s thought, are actually not real, and perhaps even illusory.\(^5\) This may be misleading, even if it is more a matter of emphasis than ontological claim. According to Alper, “Abhinava by and large repudiates those theories of appearance which emphasize the secondary or unreal nature of that which appears, which portray appearances as being no more real than ghostly objects reflected in glass.”\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Pandey, 320.

\(^5\) One example is Kamalakar Mishra who claims that, “At the very start it should be made clear that when Abhinavagupta calls the ābhāsa real, he never means to suggest that the ābhāsa is a real material thing and not an illusory appearance…. Abhinavagupta does not grant ontological reality to the world like that of a material thing.” Kamalakar Mishra, Kashmir Saivism: The Central Philosophy of Tantrism (Delhi: SriSatguru Publications, 1999), 209.

\(^5\) In fact, this is a not too uncommon problem in the understanding of Abhinava’s thought. There is a tendency of some to implement a Vedāntic understanding of the world within an interpretation of Kāśmir Saivism. This is unfortunate since part of Abhinava’s work was polemical against the Vedāntists, Buddhists, etc. For a short criticism of this modern tendency to read a Vedāntic interpretation into Abhinava, see Larson, Gerald J, “L.N. Sharma, Kashmir Saivism,” Philosophy East and West 18 (1979).

\(^5\) Alper, 361.
Instead, to maintain the non-dual nature of Abhinava’s thought, ābhāsas must be understood to have Śiva as their very nature. In fact, it is not just to maintain the non-dual reality, but it is Abhinava’s claim that to know anything at all, there must necessarily be a non-dualism, and therefore, “for knowledge to be possible the svarūpa [nature] of the object must be prakāsa [illuminating light].” In other words, ābhāsas have for their nature (svarūpa) Śiva, as He serves as the material cause for all creation.

This may entail the true reality of ābhāsas, but their nature is still not so black and white. Alper illustrates this thoughtfully:

It is difficult to find a happy English equivalent for ābhāsa. By translating it as ‘appearance’ I do not mean to imply that it means ‘what something looks like.’ On the contrary, ābhāsa is the objective aspect of every cognitive event, it is ‘that which has appeared’. As Abhinava uses the term, an ābhāsa is never the ‘image’ of something else, it is itself the ultimate objective element in the cognitive world. Hence, ābhāsa is closely allied with prakāsa: to say that objects are illumined is to say that ābhāsas appear. To say that god appears as the world (or that objects arise in god) is to say that god is constantly becoming the stream of ābhāsas. How god generates ābhāsas and how our view of them is distorted by māyā so that we see them in isolation from god are separate questions which are not directly relevant here. It should, however, be observed that, in accordance with his two-level (really multi-level) vision of reality, Abhinava seems to hold that ābhāsas are only relatively ultimate, that is, they are ultimate within the sphere of the perceptible, cognitive world, but they are sublatable by consciousness as such (or god) which in some sense does transcend them.

This loaded statement captures some of the ambiguity involved in the nature of “things,” of ābhāsas, but this is not necessarily a bad thing. The ambiguity of Abhinava’s thought is sometimes necessary and intentional on his part. It is hard for a human being to imagine the world as Abhinava describes it:

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57 Alper, 354.
58 Alper, 392-393.
as a fluid and dynamic ever-changing divine event. However, I would suggest that Alper’s claim that our view of ābhāsas being distorted by Māyā as being irrelevant to the task at hand is not completely right. For it is that very distortion by Māyā that makes our understanding of ābhāsas ambiguous! The reason, then, why ābhāsas can be claimed as “relatively ultimate” is because most people see objects as finite, independent entities, when really they are the absolute ultimate, for their nature is Śiva.

When one truly sees all ābhāsas as themselves, when he or she breaks down the boundary between “I” and “This,” the true nature is then realized—“I am Śiva!” This is Śiva-realization, the closest thing to a goal according to Abhinava’s teachings. Really, though, everyone is already realized, and so Śiva-realization is not a goal, for there is nothing to be accomplished, nothing to strive for. It is simply in realizing that “I” am “Śiva,” and that everything in creation is simply caused by my own agency, by way of limiting myself, that one realizes the point to life is already at hand. This, then, is another way of approaching creation within Abhinava’s teachings. Creation is a form of self-limitation. The problem is that at some point, the power of Māyā (which ultimately is my own power) clouds my own powers, including knowledge and action, and the result is the limited self, the individual, the human being.

So it is necessary to note that in Abhinava’s thought, there are really two foundational points that must be acknowledged. The first is that reality is non-dual, with only Śiva having being. This is the part that most people acknowledge. However, just as important is to recognize the multiplicity of that one reality.
Creation is absolutely real. This is the point that is not always acknowledged, but it is necessary to gain the proper mental understanding of this philosophy/theology. It sets up a continuum, really, between duality and unity, which encompasses the whole plurality of thought and things. It is due to this that Śiva must be understood as dynamic and multiple, at the same time that He is non-dual.
Chapter 2:

_Svātantrya as “Freedom-from”_

In this chapter, that aspect of _svātantrya_ will be discussed that connects Abhinavagupta’s system to other Indian systems, specifically Śāmkhya and Vedānta. This aspect may be alluded to as a “freedom-from”. This relates to the fact that _svātantrya_ refers ultimately to the fact that Śīva is not limited by any other thing. There are no obstacles to impede the _svātantrya_ of the Lord; He is not dependent on any other thing. Before getting into that, however, it needs to be pointed out that in discussing this aspect of _svātantrya_, the language can be interpreted in a misleading fashion.

Abhinava realized the great difficulty in treating this aspect of his system, as demonstrated in the following passage:

> The word _pratyabhijñā_ means, “to recognize, to realize your Self spontaneously once again.” Here you have only to realize, you do not have to practice. There are no _upāyas_ (means) in the Pratyabhijñā system. You must simply recognize who you are.

This quote refers back to one of the points made at the end of the last chapter. It highlights the aspect of Abhinava’s teaching that the individual is already Śīva, with nothing needed to be done or gained to accomplish the highest goal. So in the ultimate sense, there is no need for transformation, or any change at all. Instead, the individual is Śīva, and it only takes recognition of that truth to be able to utilize one’s own unlimited powers.

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60 For a non-compromising modern account of this idea, see U.G. Krishnamurti.
This is fine and good, but it is obvious that most people do not recognize their true nature as Śiva. Because of this, Kāśmir Saivite texts use language that indicate a goal, or the need to overcome obstacles, such as in the following passage from Abhinavagupta:

The person attaining that consciousness, because he is free from the bonds which cause rebirth becomes liberated even while in the body. However, when the body goes, there is only Śiva. Then who can be said to be liberated? But since what existed earlier, that person, becomes freed, becomes Śiva, [compared to the state he was in before], the scriptures like to use this type of language.\(^6\)

It is important to point this issue out because when dealing with the individual-as-Śiva, this kind of language is inevitable. One should not, however, erroneously treat all of this language on a purely surface level. In regards to the concept of svātantrya, it is important to keep this in mind, because there will be discussion of Śiva having freedom from all obstacles. In regards to the limited being realizing that she is Śiva, language is used that refers to an overcoming of obstacles and limitations.

In this way, Abhinava’s conception of Śiva mirrors that of other Indian traditions, where the absolute\(^6\) is characterized by a freedom from obstacles and limitations. For instance, in Sāṁkhya, the Puruṣa is in its ultimate sense not restricted by Prakṛti once the individual attains kaivalya. According to Gerald Larson, attaining kaivalya is an intuitive process of discrimination that leads to a sort of “negative” knowledge, “the content of which is the realization that puruṣa is separate from prakṛti. This realization is the basis of the Sāṁkhya doctrine of

\(^{61}\) IPVV, 310.

\(^{62}\) For our purposes, whatever is the ultimate principle, whether it is personal or non-personal, is the absolute.
freedom, and this realization leads ultimately to a condition of ‘isolation’
(kaivalya)." 63

For many Vedāntins, Brahman is not limited by any qualities or
attributes whatsoever. As Natalia Isayeva articulates, the negation leaves only a
pure consciousness that has nothing to do with creation:

In Śaṅkara’s Advaita the higher Brahman is regarded as essentially
ineffable (anirvacanīya), devoid of qualities or attributes (nirguna), as
something that stays beyond any possibility of evolution (aparināma)
and is nothing but pure consciousness itself (caitanya, vidyā). 64

To show how this relates to Abhinavagupta’s conception of Śiva, first it
must be affirmed that an understanding of Śiva must include freedom, or
svātantra. Abhinava unequivocally points out that freedom is, indeed, at the
very heart of understanding the central concept of Kashmir Śaivism:

This very Freedom (svātantra) is the essential nature of
consciousness. 65

It is that very consciousness that is Śiva, and so svātantra is understood to be the
very essence of the highest lord:

That lord’s highest essential nature is svātantra, with the form of
unbounded prakāśa and bliss. 66

63 Gerald Larson, Classical Sāmkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning
64 Natalia Isayeva, From Early Vedanta to Kashmir Shaivism: Gaudapada, Bhartrhari,
65 Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta: Doctrine of Divine Recognition,
vols. I, II, and III, Sanskrit Text with the Commentary Bhāskari (Princess of Wales
Saraswati Bhavan Texts Nos. 7NO0, 83, and 84. Ed. by Subramania Iyer and K.C.
Pandey. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), vol.1, 54. (Hereafter all citations will be
IPV, followed by the relevant volume used). All translations from the IPV are my own,
with the aid of Dr. Biernacki. In regards to this specific passage, I have followed the
commentary of the Bhāskari in understanding that the pronoun iyam refers to svātantra,
something that K.C. Pandey does as well.
66 IPV, vol.1, 29.
Thus, this includes that very important idea of being “free” that is espoused by other traditions like Sāṅkhya and Vedānta:

He [the Lord, Śiva] is free.\(^6\)

For Abhinava, then, this svātantrya includes within it the understanding that it is not limited by anything. It has complete independence. Remaining consistent with Indian tradition, Śiva is that being (assuming such a word is appropriate) who is not dependent on any other being, but is that which other beings are dependent on, for He creates them:

this freedom (svātantrya) is fully not dependent on another, [and is] a great lordship [power, that] created the lordship of brahma, viṣṇu, rudra, etc. This is indeed ‘the body of consciousness.’\(^6\)

This freedom, which is “the body of consciousness” that is Śiva, is completely autonomous, and furthermore, is the source of all other power. This citation is interesting for it contextualizes the deities of brahma and viṣṇu, and indeed, the connotation includes all other deities. All deities have Śiva as their source, as Śiva, because of His freedom, is independent of everything. This, of course, is necessary and obvious, for Śiva is ultimately everything.

This leads to another point of ambiguity with Abhinava. On one hand, everything has the nature of consciousness. But on the other hand, he divides creation up into two different categories. First, there are those creatures with

\(^6\) IPV, vol.1, 53.
\(^6\) IPV, vol.1, 144.
sentiency (*ajaḍa*). These are distinguished from those things that are categorized as insentients (*jāḍa*). Alper explains further:

Since Abhinava pictures the ultimate (Śiva-who-is-consciousness) as that comprehensive reality which takes form as both the subject and the object, he is impelled to hold that everything which appears is, in some sense, conscious, even though he does not want to obviate the distinction which holds true on a penultimate plane between the sentient (*ajaḍa*) and the insentient (*jāḍa*). For example, this is discussed in JSĀ 11 where Abhinava observes that “because an object such as a crystal is unable to cognize (*parāmṛstum*) either itself (*ātmanam*) or an object such as a pot it is insentient (*jāḍah*)” (198: 3ff.), but then goes on to conclude that “ultimately everything in the world is clearly sentient (*ajaḍam eva*)” (199: 1-3).\(^6^9\)

Even though I think that this is one case of a “paradoxical-tension” that shows up in Abhinava’s writings, one way of looking at it is that ultimately, from the highest points-of-view, everything is sentient. But for those stuck within the grasp of Māyā, there is a definite difference between the sentients and insentients.

In fact, *svātantrya*, or the lack thereof, is one way of categorizing the insentients:

> The power which is the nature of action, has as its very life *svātantrya*. In this way, on this level it is impossible for the insentient to have [that freedom (*svātantrya*)].\(^7^0\)

So for the purposes of exploring the “freedom-from” aspect of *svātantrya*, there is a dichotomy between those who are sentient, and those who are not; as well as, those who have freedom, and those who do not. Ultimately, though, all creative power goes back to Śīva, as does *svātantrya*. Because of this, Śīva, by virtue of having for His nature *svātantrya*, is beyond all obstacles and limitations:

> This very consciousness, in this way, is admitted as freedom (*svātantrya*) because it is defined as unrestrained and because of the force of its

\(^{6^9}\) Alper, 393.  
\(^{7^0}\) *IPV*, vol.1, 60.
particular will. Of that consciousness it is believed to be boundless because it is without obstacles remaining within, existing “as this,” which is the multitude of beings.\(^7\)

One explanation, then, for Śiva being free is that He is beyond the obscuring powers of Māyā. The limited individual, however, is not. Therefore, he or she is indicated by the word “pasu,” which literally means cattle, or beast, but in this context connotes that the limited being is a slave to his or her own ignorance and limitations. Abhinava writes:

> And he [the Subject] has as his pure nature, Śiva-self. But, [when] on the level of Māyā, it is a pasu [limited being], one whose natural state is contracted.\(^2\)

The preceding quote points out that the root of being bound, or a limited being, is that the consciousness is contracted, or limits itself. In its pure and natural state, the Subject is free. However, when the Subject loses its own freedom, and when consciousness loses its predominance, then the Subject becomes a pasu. This is the root of the misunderstanding that human beings have, as to why they do not ascertain their true nature. According to Abhinava:

> This said, it is the case that in dualistic conceptualization the Self shines as “this”, not I, whereas when the root awareness is only in “I-ness” then the Self rests in the unity of subject on the highest level.\(^3\)

When the Self shines as “this” it brings itself down to the level of object. Here, the idea of the object rings true, that it is a separate entity unto itself. With that separation comes limitation, for a pot is a pot as opposed to everything else in

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\(^7\) IPV, vol.1, 228.
\(^2\) IPV, vol.2, 42.
\(^3\) IPVV, 295.
the universe. More appropriately for most human beings, the conception is, “I am this combination of body and mind.” This, however, is a limitation:

Because of this consciousness becomes contracted and is made into an object through the state of being absorbed in the object as body etc. and fallen to the level of being a “this”. Then one says, “the one who is pale”, “the one who is happy”, “the one who is thirsty”, “the one who is devoid of all forms”—“I am that one in fact”.74

So when one says, “I am thirsty,” it is a product of a contracted consciousness. The Subject is identifying with the body/mind that is hungry. But according to Abhinavagupta, ultimately, this is similar to saying, “I am this pot,” because both are an inaccurate apprehension of one’s own true nature. Even though they are different types of misidentifications, they both are still limitations.

The irony of this last statement is that it could be true, or not true, depending upon the level of realization for the individual, or to the degree that he or she is conscious. In other words, from the highest perspectives, one might ascertain the ābhāsa known by humans as a pot. To Śiva, though, that ābhāsa is a reflection of His own divine nature, and so not different from Him. It is only a manifestation of the dynamic quality of Śiva. However, for the limited human being, that ābhāsa that he understands to be a pot is something that is separate and other. According to Abhinava, this is due to the deluding powers of Māyā:

The Subject is called a master when he understands [other objects and entities] to be [merely] the forms of his own limbs. But when he [sees] the divisions coming from Māyā [as real] he becomes bound, a beast of burden.…75

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74 IPVV, 327.
75 IPVV, 311.
This issue actually harkens back to the issue of ābhāsas that was covered before, where normally, the individual’s conception of an ābhāsa is erroneous. It is not an independent entity unto itself, but it is only because of the limited scope of consciousness that an individual sees it as such. However, an ābhāsa is independent insofar as it is understood to be a part of Śiva. The same principle is in effect with viewing all the world to be just the “limbs” of oneself. Otherwise, the limited being picks out something to make up his own limited self, and sees the rest as separate from his own self.

This misapprehension does not occur in the pure creation. The beings of the pure creation have a greater svātantrya, therefore, because they are not bound by those limitations. As was illustrated earlier, at the beginning of the process of creation, there is no dualism to be found, as in the impure creation. Instead, the world is in its incipient stage at the level of Sadāśiva. It first becomes distinct at the level of Īśvara, and at the level of Śuddhavidya, the world may be manifest, but the realization that it is still “I,” as in “I am This,” remains.

At the root of understanding the reason for the individual not knowing his or her own true nature, and therefore being categorized as having a deficiency in svātantrya, is what are known as malas, or impurities. They have their source in Māyā Śakti. According to Abhinava:

with Māyā Śakti, then, there are three kinds [of mala].

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They are not a physical substance, however, but affect the individual consciousness of the *paśu* into thinking that he or she is limited. “The āṇava, māyiya and karma maculations completely lose their original nature of ‘substances’ that physically obstruct the self of the *paśu* from without and resolve themselves into erroneous attitudes of the individual consciousness.”

For Abhinava, the *malas* have a complex relationship with one another. So even though Māyā is seen as the source for all three, on a certain level, one *mala* takes precedence over the other two:

> in the sequence of creation, the impurity of Māyā is the root source [of impurity]. On the other hand, from the reference point of the knowledge of the nature of pure awareness, Smallness impurity is [the source of impurity].

Even though from different perspectives, a different *mala* may have precedence, we will start with āṇava mala because logically speaking, it is the foundational one. It means “small,” or “smallness,” for that is the effect caused by āṇava mala. It causes the Subject to see itself as limited (not infinite, boundless, and perfectly free). There are two ways that this happens, and therefore, according to Abhinava, there are two kinds of āṇava mala:

> The impurity called āṇava is of two types. One is due to the loss of one’s true nature via the destruction of one’s freedom, even while awareness remains. The other occurs through the loss of awareness, even though freedom remains.

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77 Raffaele Torella, *The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti*, critical edition (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1994), XXXI-II. This is a translation of Utpaladeva’s text, that text which Abhinava wrote his commentary on.

78 *IPVV*, 318.

79 *IPVV*, 313.
This appears misleading on a certain level, though, for how can one lose svātantrya while maintaining bodha (awareness), as well as vice versa? How could one be perfectly free without awareness, and vice versa? The reason this is is because with ānava mala, even when one has great svātantrya, without awareness it is not a full svātantrya. The same applies for awareness when svātantrya is gone. This seems to be Biernacki’s estimation as well in her gloss of the IPPV:

The words, “by its universality” mean that even the collection of qualities, attributes such as freedom etc. don’t manifest in their fullness [in the case where another quality, such as awareness, is lacking. (?)].

The extrapolation from this is that when any attribute is missing, none of the other qualities can be full and perfected. The Subject is ultimately either perfect in all respects, or is incomplete in every respect, even if certain ones are predominant. In other words, only Śiva truly has full svātantrya or bodha. The limited subject, although really having Śiva-nature, is deluded into thinking otherwise.

This should not be much of a surprise, or considered a stretch in the understanding of ānava mala, for that is what the mala is by definition. It is smallness. That smallness applies to whatever attribute the Subject does have as well. For ultimately, svātantrya and bodha are the same for Abhinava:

Freedom is awareness. This is the reality. There, the impurity occurs by destroying [freedom] through making separate portions, because this is in fact removing its essential nature. This impurity is a contraction, limiting one’s own inherent wealth and this Smallness impurity is two-fold.

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80 IPPV, 313.
81 IPPV, 313.
“Limiting one’s own inherent wealth,” then, seems to refer not only to what the Subject lacks, but also to what the Subject has. The Subject who does not have awareness can have freedom, but only a limited freedom, for to have one without the other is not possible.

After the Subject perceives itself to be limited, and not infinite and boundless, the next *mala* that deludes it is *Māyā mala*:

> When both types of Smallness (āνавa) impurity exist there, they set in motion the contraction of one’s real form. Then the division, the duality which spreads out is called *Māyā*.\(^{82}\)

*Māyā mala* causes the Subject to see duality in the world because it sees the objects of the world as separate from itself. *Māyā mala*, then, is the direct cause for the duality that we see in the world.

*Karma mala*, then, is that impurity that directly ties one to the world of birth and rebirth. For Abhinava, it also is the cause of the limited experiences in that cycle of birth and rebirth:

> Nevertheless, the impurity called *karma* is the cause of happiness and unhappiness, of the various experiences, of the length of life, of one’s particular fate and type of birth.\(^{83}\)

The *malas*, then, are at the heart of what needs to be overcome by the Subject in order to enter the realm of the pure creation. Therefore, part of the defining feature of *svātantrya* is that it is beyond the limitations instantiated as the *malas*. In order for the Subject to become completely free, and to overcome all obstacles, according to Abhinava it must overcome all three of the *malas*:

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\(^{82}\) *IPVV*, 317.

\(^{83}\) *IPVV*, 317.
The Gods, etc. have the nature of freedom which is the Principle of consciousness in the form of awareness which has pushed aside impurity by allowing the portion of doership to come to the fore.\textsuperscript{84}

With this then, we learn that the \textit{svātantra} of Śiva entails that it is not limited by anything.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{IPVV}, 326.
Chapter 3:

Svātantrya as “Freedom-to”

The previous section focused on the fact that Śiva is beyond all obstacles and limitations due to His svātantrya. Śiva is not bound by anything, and He has absolute independence and self-autonomy. On the highest level, this is rather quite obvious, for Śiva is the only reality, so how could there be anything to limit Him? However, this “freedom-from” is not the only characteristic of that svātantrya. In fact, unlike other traditions, like Vedānta and Śāmkhya, the svātantrya of Abhinava’s thought does not even see “freedom-from” as the characteristic most worthy of emphasis. This is of the utmost importance, for this is at the heart of the greatest difference between Kaśmir Śaivism and the traditions of Vedānta and Śāmkhya. Without understanding this difference, which can be articulated as the addition of “freedom-to,” meaning the freedom to accomplish or do activity, to the “freedom-from,” one cannot come to even a basic understanding of Śiva according to Abhinavagupta. It is “freedom-to” that allows Śiva to have action. In fact, according to Kamalakar Mishra, “Unless there is also ‘freedom-to,’ the freedom of the Absolute cannot be complete. ‘Freedom’ implies the ability to act. If Śiva is not free to act, He is then really limited; Śiva becomes just like the bound individual.”

Mishra points out a very profound idea. From the Kaśmir Śaivaite perspective, because of the elimination of the

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85 Mishra, 111-112. For obvious reasons, it should be pointed out that Mishra used the terms “freedom-to” and “freedom-from” before I did.
aspect of svātantra that allows for action, the “freedom-to” aspect, the Brahman of Vedānta, and the Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya, are not really free.

Be that as it may, “freedom-to” for Abhinavagupta starts with that all-important differentiation between his thought and that of other traditions: agency. Recall that in other traditions, action is seen as something which the absolute has freedom from. In other word, action is seen by traditions like Sāṃkhya and Vedānta as a limitation that must be overcome. For instance, within the Sāṃkhya tradition, there is the famous image of a lame man carrying a blind man on his shoulders. The blind man represents Prakṛti, and the lame man represents Puruṣa. The blind man lacking sight represents the fact that Prakṛti lacks consciousness. Meanwhile, the lame man indicates the fact that Puruṣa is without the ability to act. As we learned from the last chapter, the goal of Sāṃkhya is to isolate Puruṣa from Prakṛti, and therefore, kaivalya entails a state of “freedom-from” action.

For Abhinava, however, svātantra is inextricably related to action. In fact, a lack of action would be tantamount to having a lack of freedom. Action, or agency, is crucial for the proper understanding of Abhinava’s idea of svātantra.

Recall in the last chapter the discussion on sentient and non-sentient beings. It was declared by Abhinava that:

The power which is the nature of action, has as its very life svātantra. In this way, on this level it is impossible for the insentient to have [that freedom (svātantrya)].

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86 IPV, vol.1, 60.
Last time this quote was cited, it was to point out the fact that the insentient objects lack the *svātantrya* that sentient beings have. Within this context, a syllogism can be set up to further explain both the sentients, as well as *svātantrya*. The insentients do not have *svātantrya*. *Svātantrya* is the life (*prāṇa*) of action. Therefore, insentients are also understood as being without action, or agency. On the other hand, sentients have at least a certain level of *svātantrya*, because they also have a certain level of agency. Abhinava is claiming that without the propensity for action, one actually has an absence of *svātantrya*. Action, then, is one of the telltale signs of the existence of *svātantrya*.

*Ahambhāva*87 is indeed said to be the *visṛṇti*88 of the self of *prakāśa*. And indeed, this *visṛṇti* is said to be the confinement in regard to everything. Now, the chief attribute of *svātantrya* is doership, and moreover, it is the state of lordship.89

This profound statement reveals a number of things. First, the pure “I-feeling” (*abhambhāva*) is the repose of the self in the ultimate sense, because that self is of the nature of *prakāśa*, which is the shining, illuminative light that is consciousness. That *visṛṇti* (the rest, or abiding) of the self, then, indicates the blocking of the manifestation of everything. In Jaideva Singh’s commentary on this quotation, which is used in the *Parātrīṣikā-Vivarana*, the *ahambhāva* has to do with the withdrawal of the manifold creation, and the eventual coming to rest in the unmanifest *Śiva*.90 The most important thing to point out of the second sentence of the passage, though, is that the self is at a state of rest, what many

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87 *Ahambhāva*, according to Biernacki, is the Pure “I”. According to Jaideva Singh’s commentary on the *Parātrīṣikā-Vivarana*, the *ahambhāva* is the “real I-feeling.”
88 *rest, repose, abiding.*
89 *IPV*, vol.1, 35.
90 Singh, 55.
would see as a state of inactivity. The final sentence highlights the fact that action is seen as a defining feature of svātantrya. When someone exercises the powers of agency, svātantra is being demonstrated. Furthermore, this attribute of svātantra, doership, is what defines one’s claim to having lordship. It is, therefore, up to each individual being and his own svātantra that allows for him to act, to actually make himself into a lord (one who has lordship):

> But they [all those with lordship] become lords by the sparks of the lordship, belonging to them [selves].

The final thing to be said about the quote regarding svātantra and viśrānti is to point out the seeming juxtaposition that occurs. First, Abhinava is writing about rest, the seeming lack of action. One might conclude from that, that when the self is characterized by viśrānti, it loses its svātantra. This is not the case, however. Perhaps in anticipation of this, in the Bhāskarī (the commentary on Abhinava’s commentary on the kārikās of Utpaladeva), the following question is asked and answered:

> What is viśrānti? “Svātantra.”

How can viśrānti be considered svātantra? What the Bhāskarī is pointing out is that rest is actually at heart simply a form of activity. That is why it is fitting that viśrānti can be translated with the more traditionally active word “abiding”. The extension of this, then, is that in Abhinava’s thought, there is a constant sense of activity if even rest is considered a result of agency. This flies right in the face of

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91 IPV, vol.1, 29.
92 IPV, vol.1, 35.
Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, which as we have already seen, limit the scope of action. Vedānta limits activity to only the realm of Māyā, and thereby treats it as something that is not ultimately real. Sāṃkhya may not deny the reality of it like Vedānta, but similarly, it does see action as something to be overcome to reach the state of kaivalya. For Abhinava, it is not just a matter of making a value statement about action (which he does, that it is important), but he points out the inaccuracy of claiming it is possible to be without action while maintaining any level of svātantrya.

In fact, there is a branch of Kaśmir Śaivism that puts an emphasis on the constant movement of Śiva.93 While Abhinava is not known to have commented on the texts of the Spanda school of Kasmir Śaivism, “the term spanda occurs frequently in his writings.”94 Spanda is at the heart of explaining why Abhinava’s idea of reality is different than Vedānta’s, for it also is an explanation for how even visrānti can be categorized as action.

*Spanda* is the primordial vibration that is internal to consciousness.

According to Muller-Ortega:

> The Heart of Siva is not a static or inert absolute, however. In fact, the non-dual Kashmir Shaiva tradition considers it to be in a state of perpetual movement, a state of vibration (*spanda*) in which it is continuously contracting and expanding (*samkoca-vikāsa*), opening and closing (*unmeśa-nimeśa*), trembling (*ullasitā*), quivering (*sphuritā*), throbbing, waving, and sparkling (*ucchalatā*). The intensity and speed of this movement is such that paradoxically it is simultaneously a perfect dynamic stillness.95

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93 Often called the Spanda branch, school, or tradition. This would include the two early figures, Vasugupta and Kallata.
94 Muller-Ortega, 118.
95 Muller-Ortega, 83.
From this we learn that motion has its basis in *spanda*, which is the original movement that has no beginning or end. Connecting motion to *spanda* is one way of showing that motion is grounded in Śiva, for it is *spanda* that explains how motion is an inherent part of His nature. Through *spanda*, then, motion is shown as connected to svātantrya, for it is *spanda* that explains how Śiva has svātantrya, and it is by this primordial motion that His svātantrya is expressed. For Abhinava, one implies the other. It is then in the externalization and grossification of the central *spanda* that all other motions materialize. Muller-Ortega point out that the constant internal dynamism is the source of all other motion, or movement. “This internal dynamism serves as the source for the external movement that results in the process of manifestation.”\(^{96}\) Action, then, is defined by this movement, for it is action that is the cause of manifestation, or creation; and therefore, action is the external movement that has as its basis the internalized movement of *spanda*, which is inseparable from svātantrya. It is in the flow from the internal movement to the external action that one sees the connection between, *spanda*, action, and svātantrya.

This *spanda* is at the heart of reality, and it explains why Śiva is not like the static *Brahman* of Vedānta, but is instead fluid and dynamic. Change and multiplicity are simply the result of the overflowing of and in the Self.\(^{97}\) Furthermore, Muller-Ortega connects this *spanda* to svātantrya: “This vibration is the power found in the Heart, which consists essentially of an undivided self-

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\(^{96}\) Muller-Ortega, 120.
\(^{97}\) Muller-Ortega, 119.
referential consciousness (*avibhāga-parāmarṣarūpa*), which is complete freedom (*svātantrya*).\(^9^8\)

Recall that earlier a distinction was made in regard to the two aspects of Śiva. One was *prakāśa*, the aspect of light, or shining. The other was *vimarṣa* (active awareness), which is the active and reflective quality of that light that is Śiva. Recall also, that the claim was made that both *prakāśa* and *vimarṣa* were related to knowledge and action, respectively:

> This is because of the mutual inseparability of *jñāna*, Knowledge and *kriyā*, Activity which have the respective natures of expansive Light and Active Awareness. And “that” alone is the highest ultimate nature of all entities. Because of this the Lord does have the freedom to manifest this expansion [which is the universe] and to perform all the five acts [of creation, maintenance, etc.] by means of accepting the power of *kriyā*, action.\(^9^9\)

We have just shown how Abhinava relates *svātantrya* as the essence of action. Therefore, it is a reasonable conclusion that *svātantrya*, to the extent that the two aspects are distinguished from one another, is related to the *vimarṣa* aspect of Śiva. When one compares Abhinava’s system to that of Vedānta, it is the idea of *vimarṣa* that distinguishes one from the other. It is *vimarṣa* that gives Śiva the freedom appearing as action. Indeed, Pandey even sometimes translates *vimarṣa* as “freedom.”\(^1^0^0\) Abhinava explicitly verifies this connection between *vimarṣa*, *svātantrya*, and action:

> Knowledge is the form of *prakāśa* there, and thus, action is the form of *vimarṣa*, which has the essence of *svātantrya*.\(^1^0^1\)

\(^9^8\) Muller-Ortega, 91.  
\(^9^9\) *IPV*, vol.3, 118; cf. *IPV*, vol.1, 423-424.  
\(^1^0^0\) Muller-Ortega, 91.  
\(^1^0^1\) *IPV*, vol.1, 423.
At this point, one may ask the legitimate question of why svātantrya only pertains to action and not knowledge. The first part of answering this is to point out again that ultimately, prakāśa and vimarsa are not two different entities, or parts of Śiva. They are one in the highest sense. Logically speaking, then, if the root of two powers is ultimately one, would that not mean that the two powers, in this case knowledge and action, are ultimately the same? This is affirmed by one of Utpaladeva’s kārikās that Abhinava comments on:

In this way, kriyā, Activity, functions both internally and externally following a temporal sequence. It belongs to the Subject alone. Knowledge and actions are inseparably mutually associated with that [Subject].

We learn from this passage that knowledge and action are only related to the Subject, which makes perfect sense. After all, one does not attribute the powers of knowing or doing to objects. Most importantly for us, however, is the affirmation that knowledge and action are connected.

So in the ultimate sense, in regards to consciousness, which is the ultimate principle that makes up all of reality, knowledge and action are encompassed by that one true reality:

Here, this is the true form of the state of consciousness to the extent that it is the form of the doer and the knower.

So it is that Śiva has the two powers unseparated:

It is correct that God who is really the Supreme [transcendent] Śiva, even though existing [at this highest level] without sequence [still] has the Energies of Knowledge and Activity joined.

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102 IPVV, 257.
104 IPVV, 262.
So not only is svātantrya connected to action, but also to knowledge. Abhinava explicitly affirms this:

Thus knowing of this, the Self is the form of the Lord and when not excluded from the Self, there is the form of only freedom (svātantrya), which is both knowledge and action. Being in this way, that is the Self.105

This passage shows that the Self, or the subject, has the form of the Lord, which already indicates that it has agency. But here svātantrya is described as being connected to knowledge and action. Specifically, it is the Self that has svātantrya, and it is because of that very fact that the Self has not just agency, but also knowledge. In fact this passage actually sets up the equation of the two powers being of the form of svātantrya. It is because the Self has svātantrya that it can have knowledge and action.

Once the limited individual realizes this connection, or establishes him or herself in svātantrya, that individual is then able to realize that he or she is Śiva:

He who is indeed established in freedom (svātantrya) of both knowledge and action, he is the Lord who is talked about in the purāṇas, siddhānta, etc. And you are thus [that].106

From this we learn that in order to be the Lord, one must not have any limitations upon his powers of knowledge and action. By being established in svātantrya, the Lord must essentially be omniscient, and not just omnipotent. One cannot be Lord just by having action. There must be both. Furthermore, one learns from the passage that he or she truly is that same Lord imbued with  

106 IPV, vol.2, 144.
svātantrya. The reader is in reality the same Śiva that is glorified and made famous in the scriptures (“purāṇas, siddhānta, etc”).

Abhinava again tries to bring the point out that the reader really does have svātantrya, and that it is demonstrated within the realm of both action and knowledge:

One’s very own lordship is made visible as characterized by svātantrya of action, “he does,” and knowledge, “he knows.”

When someone does something, that is evidence of svātantrya. When someone knows something, there again is evidence of svātantrya.

Because of this, svātantrya is not simply limited to the ultimate, or just to the highest Śiva. Wherever there is action or knowledge, svātantrya is also there.

In reality everywhere doership belongs to Śiva alone. Even so because of the will of the Lord from the notion of personal ego it is said of others that they have doership.

Even though in this passage it only says that, “doership belongs to Śiva alone,” we now know that knowership is inseparable from doership. Therefore, it can be said that the others, meaning limited beings (any beings other than Śiva), have both knowership and doership. On the mundane level that many people accept as reality, there is still svātantrya, for there is still action and knowledge, and they still are not separate from each other. This even applies to the lowly insect:

However, even [though it exists as a unity] a manifestation of distinctness is not extremely impossible. He shows this by the word “whole”. And this occurs, [the text says] “at the level of the creator”.

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107 IPV, vol.1, 343.
108 IPVV, 261.
When those [beings] belonging to Māyā—even down to an insect—when they do their own deeds, that which is to be done first stirs in the heart.\textsuperscript{109}

Since there is the existence of action in the life of an insect, knowledge is also there because of the unified nature of the two.\textsuperscript{110} If this is so for an insect, it surely applies to the human. Abhinava explicitly affirms both knowledge and action for the human being, who is the same thing as the \textit{pasu}, or bound soul:

So it is correct to say that even for bound souls, knowledge and action are mutually inseparably present.\textsuperscript{111}

Abhinava gives an example of this “mundane”, or incomplete (\textit{apūrṇa}) \textit{svātantrya} in the form of a response to the Buddhists who would deny such freedom of the individual:

In this way, the state of being a cognizer is more than mere cognition [i.e. perception]. The causing of the joining or detaching with /of cognitions according to taste is \textit{svātantrya}, and that is what is called being a doer.\textsuperscript{112}

This passage proclaims that human beings have \textit{svātantrya}, even if it is limited; and it is demonstrated by the fact that humans have some control over what they think. Humans can select what to think, or decide to observe one thing over another. To that extent, a human does and knows.

With that said, however, it is important to reiterate that ultimately, it is only Śiva that acts or knows:

\textsuperscript{109} IPVV, 260.

\textsuperscript{110} Biernacki points out that this knowledge is not a “thinking,” so much as it is a “visceral awareness” (Biernacki, 11).

\textsuperscript{111} IPVV, 260.

\textsuperscript{112} IPV, vol.1, 164-165.
Mahesvara [the Great Lord—Śiva] is the doer and the knower in this designation also.\textsuperscript{113}

For even though the limited jīva (limited soul, which is to say the paśu) does have the capacity for limited knowledge and action, ultimately, only Śiva has action and knowledge. For Mahesvara is indeed the same as the paśu. However, Mahesvara is the Self in its fullness, where it does not see duality. Rather, it sees all the world as an extension of itself. However, that same being in its state of paśu sees duality all around. It sees the things of the world as manifest separately from itself due to the obscuring power of Māyā.

To merely equate action and knowledge, however, as nothing but the same thing, in a one to one relationship, i.e., A=A, is an oversimplification of the power of Śiva, and of ourselves. For Abhinava does, indeed, give a certain level of priority in the consideration of knowledge, as opposed to action. Abhinava quotes his own Tantrāloka to point this out in the IPV:

\begin{quote}
So, even that which is called Action is really only just knowledge.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Here he seems to conflate action into the category of knowledge.

Elsewhere, Abhinava is actually more descriptive and metaphorical in his connecting action to knowledge:

\begin{quote}
Indeed, action will be described as being essentially a sprout\textsuperscript{115} of knowledge.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{113} IPV, vol.1, 54.
\textsuperscript{114} IPV, 259, quoted from Tantrāloka, 1/155.
\textsuperscript{115} pallava: sprout, or blossom, which has the connotation of spreading, or expansion.
\textsuperscript{116} IPV, vol.1, 53-54.
To a certain degree, here, I think a parallel can be made comparing the non-dual relationship between knowledge and action, and the relationship between *prakāśa* and *vimarsa*. It would be this parallel, then, that could help explain and allow for the correlation that Abhinava makes between *prakāśa* and knowledge, and then *vimarsa* with action. Hopefully, also, it can help to form a better understanding of action and knowledge.

Although completely undivided, Abhinava still speaks of *prakāśa* and *vimarsa* as being different aspects of the one Śiva. And in this capacity, it is *vimarsa* that is spoken grammatically as an adjective of *prakāśa*. For instance, the following statement:

*And *vimarsa* is *prakāśa* made internal.*

Hypothetically speaking, it is possible to have just *prakāśa* without *vimarsa*. This is what would be favored by the Vedāntist, where there would just be a pure shining. But Abhinava revolts against this idea of a pure shining consciousness:

*If [it, one’s own nature] is with the form of a mere perfected consciousness, then the separating of cognitions and the non-duality of distinctions by internal arranging may not be possible.*

In other words, if consciousness is a strict monistic purity, then how does one explain the world, the inner workings of the mind, or the multiplicity that is all around? This is the dilemma that Vedānta finds itself in. This is the result of a “mere perfected consciousness,” according to Abhinava.

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117 *IPV*, vol.1, 423.
118 *IPV*, vol.1, 49-50.
Instead of that, Abhinava wants a consciousness that is comfortable both with unity and diversity. Incidentally, for Abhinava, this is because Śiva, consciousness, has svātantrya:

> It is about to be described that the Lord’s freedom (svātantrya), which is differentiated in non-difference and united in division by the internal setting in order, has many modes.\(^{119}\)

It has already been established that it is because of vimarsa that Śiva has that svātantrya which is able to maintain the unity of the Lord even while there is multiplicity. This gets at the heart of the matter of how “vimarsa is prakāsa made internal.” It gives consciousness the quality of self-awareness and allows it to maintain the unity even in diversity. Paul Muller-Ortega points out that this is essential to understanding what consciousness is:

> Abhinavagupta begins by underscoring the inherent capacity for self-referral (vimarsa) that is, according to tradition, the essential characteristic of consciousness. This doubling back of consciousness on itself does not represent a separate moment in consciousness, but is rather a continuous and inescapable component of consciousness, intrinsic to the sheer appearance of consciousness (prakāsa).\(^{120}\)

The reason why all of this seems applicable to the discussion of the unity of knowledge and action, is because logically speaking, both relationships give priority to one term over the other. For consciousness, prakāsa has the logical priority because, as was mentioned before, one can imagine a hypothetical situation where there is just the shining light (prakāsa). On the flip side, one cannot imagine a self-reflecting quality (vimarsa) on its own. Self-reflecting must first have a self! Instead, “vimarsa is prakāsa made internal.”

\(^{119}\) *IPV*, vol.1, 53.

\(^{120}\) Muller-Ortega,119.
We have already seen that action is seen as blossoming from knowledge, and it has even been described as simply being nothing more than action. But when these points are being made, it is not meant to efface the term “action”. It still has validity. Instead, it may be appropriate to see action and knowledge’s relationship more like the connection between *prakāśa* and *vimaraṇa*.

Additionally, it may be helpful to relate the relationship between action and knowledge to the states of *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara*, which Abhinava does:

> Knowledge and activity are respectively [associated with] *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara*.\(^{121}\)

Recall from earlier that *Sadāśiva* is the first *tattva* to be manifested from *Śiva-Sakti*, and it is where the first indication of the object (“Thisness”) is. *Īśvara* is the next *tattva*, where “Thisness” becomes distinct.

It is important to point out that even though they are separate *tattvas*, helping to make the template of creation, *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* really are not separate entities. Instead, they are descriptive of two ways of being for *Śiva*. Biernacki helps to make this point more clear after the following passage from Abhinava:

> *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* are not different from the Archetype of *Śiva*; [they represent two modes within it, the latter with distinctly formed objects and the former without them].\(^{122}\)

*Sadāśiva* is that state where objects are in an incipient form, for there is only the initial stirring of creation. *Īśvara*, on the other hand, is that mode of *Śiva* where

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\(^{121}\) *IPVV*, 270.  
\(^{122}\) *IPVV*, 269.
the objects are fully blossomed and defined. However, the object is still contained within the Subject, or the “I”. “When this universe, which is to be created, has sprouted in fullness, and yet is still wrapped with the I-Consciousness of Lord Śiva, this is the element Īśvara.” It is the state where the world is actually formed, if only within the Subject. These two tattvas, instead of being separate entities, are really two stages within the one process of creation and dissolution.

Similar to this relation between Sadāśiva and Īśvara, knowledge and action, instead of representing separate powers, take on the role of the same power. However, the mode of the one and the other are different, which allows for some level of distinction, but not separation.

Biernacki likes to think of action and knowledge as being on a continuum where there is a flow, one to the other, as well as vice versa. “Abhinavagupta meticulously strives to reconfigure the relationship between knowledge and action not as oppositional, but rather as the flow of a continuum, where action flows into knowledge and knowledge flows into action.” Instead of separate things and entities, then, it is better to think of these as differing actions along the same foundation. With that said, though, knowledge still has some level of priority over action, and it is because knowledge is the source of that activity. Biernacki shows how this works:

Action, which at its core incorporates a notion of time, for Abhinavagupta, starts out as consciousness, i.e., knowledge which stirs in the heart. This knowledge is not necessarily the articulation of a thought, what we [in the 20th century West] might call consciousness;

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123 Hughes, 60.
124 Biernacki, 6-7.
worms certainly do not think. [In the view of Kasmir Śaivism] Rather it is a visceral awareness, which through its movement in stages becomes intent which then gets externalized as a deed.\textsuperscript{125}

It is that externalization that indicates action within this context. Notice that this is just like the relationship of action to \textit{spanda}, where action is seen as the externalization of the internal movement of \textit{spanda}.

According to Abhinava, not only is externalization an indication of action, so is the idea of an increased determination:

\begin{quote}
When the Energy manifest inwardly, naturally it is called the Energy of Knowledge. However, when it expands in stages with its active awareness gradually becoming more firm and fixed, then it manifest externally. This is pointed as the Energy of Activity.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

It is the motion, or flow of the Energy, which really is consciousness, that determines knowledge and action. Because of this, one really can say, that action is knowledge.

Now that we have explored the nature of knowledge and activity, as well as the relation of one to the other, I want to backtrack just a little. Earlier, the relation of \textit{prakāśa} and \textit{vimarsa} was compared to knowledge and action. Even though there is the parallel between the two, I do not see the relations as exactly the same, and the following is the reason why.

It is true that both \textit{prakāśa} and knowledge serve as the base for their counterpart, and to that extent Abhinava says that knowledge has the nature of \textit{prakāśa}. Action follows in the same way, in its relationship to \textit{vimarsa}, for they both are the “adjectives” of their counterparts. However, the relation between

\textsuperscript{125} Biernacki, 11-12.  
\textsuperscript{126} IPVV, 262.
knowledge and action is a flow along a continuum. As we have already seen, knowledge, though, takes priority for it is that which action is an extension of. Action flows out of knowledge, and the reverse may be true, but knowledge is the original impetus. It is the flow that allows for the continuity and non-duality between action and knowledge.

With *prakāśa* and *vimāraśa*, however, there is not this same relationship of flow. Even though logically speaking *prakāśa* may have priority, in reality there never was a *prakāśa* without *vimāraśa*. Because of this, *vimāraśa* does not “flow” out of or back into *prakāśa*. *Vimāraśa* may be the explanation of why *prakāśa* is imbued with motion and externality, but it itself is not an “extension” of *prakāśa*. It is the reflective capacity of *prakāśa*. Because of this, one can agree, like Abhinava, that *vimāraśa* is the essence of *prakāśa*:

and that *prakāśa* has as its essence *vimāraśa*…

However, it is misleading, if not erroneous, to say that action is the essence of knowledge. For Abhinava makes it clear that there is a real priority of knowledge over action, even if ultimately they are the same power. As far as I am aware of, the closest Abhinava comes to prioritizing *prakāśa* is by saying *vimāraśa* is its essence. This is not really prioritizing one over the other, though. It is simply pointing out the vitality and dynamism that is the shining illuminative light, which is *prakāśa*.

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127 *IPV*, vol.1, 273.
It is because of the *svātantrya* of Śiva that Abhinava is able to distinguish between his philosophy and that of Vedānta, while at the same time, keeping the quality of “absoluteness,” or ultimacy that is necessary to maintain the non-dualism that is one of the hallmarks of these systems. Without *svātantrya*, Abhinava’s Śiva, like the Vedāntic Brahman, would fall into the torpor of a static reality. While there may be an aesthetic appeal to the unchanging Brahman, to many such as Abhinava, this reality is akin to death. This is why Muller-Ortega writes that, “To wish to define the Ultimate reality as a silence that transcends all characterizations would be to distort and demote the absolute into a powerless and useless ultimate.”¹²⁸ Due to *svātantrya*, Abhinava’s idea of Śiva necessitates a dynamic reality characterized by change, fluidity, and motion. It is because of *svātantrya* that things are possible:

the one who is free is the one who can exist in whatever way he or she desires, unimpeded, unrestricted. And God does indeed have this freedom, he has the fullness of everything as his own.¹²⁹

Śiva, of course, is the one who is free, and because of this, there are no limitations upon what can be done. This brings out the idea that really, the aspect of *svātantrya* discussed in the second chapter, is really just a complementary approach to that result which we find in this current chapter. In other words, *svātantrya* as “freedom-from” ultimately leads to the same conclusion about the nature of *svātantrya*, as “freedom-to” does. They may emphasize different aspects, but is not infinite freedom the same as absolutely unlimited freedom?

¹²⁸ Muller-Ortega, 120.
¹²⁹ *IPVV*, 320.
This verse seems to ratify this conclusion, for Śiva can “exist in whatever way,” for there are no restrictions upon what Śiva can exist as. Śiva contains within Himself every possibility, for, “he has the fullness of everything as his own.”

This encompasses those possibilities that seem illogical, or go against the understood laws of nature. According to Biernacki in her gloss of the following quote from Abhinavagupta, what happens does so because of the will of Śiva, and not because it satisfies one’s desire for logical consistency within the natural laws of nature:

Having stated the topic in this way because of its applicability, [we see that] at the time of perceiving one’s own self, happiness and pain, etc., as objects to be known, exist without reference to the expansion and outflow of the external world. [I.e., happiness etc., exist primarily in the mind and not outside us]. He relates this idea on this occasion, saying, “and of minds also”. In this way [what is created with] the outflow of prāṇa which is by its inherent nature the gross expansion and outflow of the world and which is preceded by perception, this really does not exist even when there is an [external] object there. This is stated. However, that which is made by the will of the Lord, since it does not begin with [mere] intellect, is like the blowing of a bellows. That exists even when there is no object there. [I believe that what Abhinava is saying here is that our interpretations of “things” in the world when they arise merely from mental cogitation have no actual real validity; they are not “true statements” in any practical or effective sense of the word. In contrast, what God wills, since it comes from a much deeper level than mere mind or intellect, has the force of reality even when it seems contrary to the physical laws of the universe.]¹³⁰

This really should come to no surprise, for the physical laws of the universe would be dependent upon Śiva’s will, upon Him having svātantrya. They are Śiva’s laws, and since He has no limitation, and is perfectly free to do and be whatever, Śiva would only be restrained by such laws if that were His choice. Otherwise, they are not an obstacle to the svātantrya of the Lord.

¹³⁰ IPVV, 349.
Because of this, it is Śiva’s svātantrya that is at the root of all creation:

These souls, [not having attained the highest] are created as separate like a pot etc., [is created as something separate from the potter]. They are created by the Nourisher, the supreme Lord who by his own freedom unceasingly nourishes them, and who by this freedom desired to exist separately from the presence of His own Self. In that way they are created separately, like a pot, etc.131

Here, Abhinava is referring to the limited souls and their creation. Their creation is a direct effect of the svātantrya of the Lord, and the reason for their creation is because of the desire of the Lord to be separate from Himself. The root of this desire and the ensuing separation is due to that same svātantrya that creates. So both the impetus and the instrument for creation are rooted within the svātantrya of Śiva.

Concerning that individual [and separate] soul called “pasu” is surely not any other than the “I”. But also, that is the one dense mass of the one prakāśa that includes [both] the object and the subject. That highest is in fact I, and He is, in fact I. There is no other. From this, even the manifold [dual, multiple] creation is a characteristic of svātantrya, “my greatness/majesty”.132

This verse further points out that Śiva runs the gamut, as He is the Subject [the “I”], and that includes the limited and bound soul, or the pasu. He runs the gamut in that not only is He the limited subject, but also is the object which is implied by that limited subject. There is no difference between Śiva and the Subject, that “I” that is experienced by every being. For ultimately, there is only one. This process of limiting and expanding, of obscuring and revealing, is the process of creation. And that is only a part of the Lord’s svātantrya. That process of

131 IPVV, 319.
creation, then, is in fact that which is singled out as the “greatness/majesty” of the Lord.

This again, is a major difference between Abhinava’s system, and the Vedānta. For creation is treated by the latter as ultimately not real. It is illusory, and is only an obstacle on the way to true enlightenment. That same attitude of Vedānta can be attributed to Sāmkhya also, for although it does not deny the reality of creation, it does advise that it is something to be ignored. Abhinava, however, sees creation as one with Śiva, just as the power of Māyā is:

The Archetype of Māyā, is not accepted merely as the material cause in the body and as separate [from the Lord, as is the case in Sāmkhya with Prakṛti], but rather is considered as the inseparable Energy (Sakti) of the Supreme Lord.\textsuperscript{133}

It is because of Māyā, the power of the Lord, that creation occurs, in the sense of separate appearances. Multiplicity happens. This is the way that Abhinava explains the works of the creation of duality, of how the many have their source in the one:

However, when by the power of Māyā, which is the form of freedom (svātantrya) appearing as divided, then this [referring to the ābhāsas] manifest externally.\textsuperscript{134}

Not only is Māyā the source of all creation, which is the external manifestation, it also is svātantrya in the form of division, of multiplicity. Māyā is a form of svātantrya. So within the inner workings of creation, it is freedom known as Māyā that is responsible for multiplicity.

\textsuperscript{133} IPVV, 270.
\textsuperscript{134} IPV, vol.1, 416.
But it does not stop there, because for Abhinava, it is not just the creation of the “This” that creates a duality. It is not simply in having appearances that there is duality. Duality is also dependent on how those appearances, or ābhāsas, are apprehended. As was pointed out earlier in this thesis, it is in the apprehending of the object, that which is not “I,” that limitation and duality occur. According to Abhinava’s quoting of Utpaladeva:

However, one single essence pervades through this duality—that is seeing what is not-Self as the I—whether it be the Void or in the intellect or in the body. This is the Energy of Māyā yawning open.\footnote{IPVV, 280.} \footnote{IPV, vol.1, 315-316.}

Thus, Māyā is the root of error, for it is the power of obscuring. However, it is a power due to the svātantra of the Lord. In fact, as the following quote shows, the reason for the existence of Māyā is rooted in the fact that the Lord has the desire to conceal or hide itself from itself. And once again, Māyā is a form of freedom:

But in the obscuration of that not-shining from non-difference is the form of the desire for the concealing of one’s own nature of the Highest Lord. [This] is the form of error, and the power of māyā is the cause, which is the form of svātantra.\footnote{IPVV, 280.}

In the introduction, the question was asked about whether it was possible for God to create a rock so heavy that even He could not move it. It is because of this action of Māyā, which is rooted in svātantra, that Abhinava is able to answer in the affirmative. For in this system, the pasū is the metaphorical rock, and the crux on which the answer to the question stands. In fact, for Abhinava, the more profound question would be about whether God can limit Himself to the point that
He cannot lift an ordinary boulder. For this, too, Abhinava answers affirmatively.

The connotations of this are manifold. Because all possibilities are contained within the svātantra of Śiva, God, the one and only Subject—even reality, can limit and delude Himself, due to the power of Māyā:

And it has been ascertained that he [the Subject] is free. And he has as his pure nature, Śiva-self. But, [when] on the level of Māyā, it is paśu, one whose nature is contracted [or limited].\(^{137}\)

Where other theologians dare not go, Abhinava boldly claims that God can indeed do anything, even those things that many would deem as illogical, unreasonable, or even blasphemous. But it is in this affirmation that Abhinava can maintain the non-duality of reality, while not denying the life of “ordinary experience.” At the very center of this system, that which makes all of it possible is svātantra, the freedom of Śiva.

\(^{137}\) *IPV*, vol.2, 42.
Conclusion

All the major concepts that have been explored in this thesis can be understood as having svātantrya as their hub, or central concept. This is not to say that one cannot give a portrayal of the central concepts with something other than svātantrya as the center. One certainly could do so with many other concepts. However, if Abhinava’s concept of svātantrya were taken away, what would be left? The system would be completely changed, just like if the idea of consciousness (cit) were taken away. Svātantrya, then, is one of the necessary central concepts, among many, that helps to demonstrate the “diversity of connotation and the actual co-referentiality of the various terms that designate ultimacy.”  

One cannot understand svātantrya without also having an understanding of such concepts as prakāśa, vimarṣa, jñāna (knowledge), and kriyā (action). When this understanding is reached, however, a beautifully vibrant, alive, and considerate system is revealed.

Svātantrya is the most relevant focus, however, for the purposes of this thesis in its exploration of the central theological question that was proposed at the beginning. It is because svātantrya so directly and deeply addresses the issue of “impossibility,” which is so central to our theological dilemma that it is essential to come to a certain understanding of Abhinava’s idea of freedom. Indeed, it is in the process of creation that one can claim that Abhinava sees

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138 Alper, 348.
svātantrya as the justification, starting off point, and center for Śiva

accomplishing the seemingly impossible:

Here, that ultimate freedom is of the highest Lord, in which we are, accomplishing the very difficult, which is impossible in the particular state of being a paśu, which comes earlier. And here, what will be very difficult? When one’s own prakāśa is shining as undivided identity, that shining is appearing as the negation of the act of shining. Therefore, that ultimate freedom of the highest Lord, in that way, is not shining when that form, by the name of paśu, is manifest. [This] establishes the portion of the subject, and by means of that, the object also blossoms [or, comes into being]. That is called the power of Māyā of the Lord. Thus it has been spoken: the deluder is, by name, Māyā. This, in this way, because of the freedom (svātantrya), which is the power of Māyā, it [the paśu] is that way.\(^{139}\)

Creation happens because Śiva can accomplish the impossible. In the previous quote, Abhinava says that the exact nature of impossibility is making the shining appear as not shining. This means that Śiva can limit His own consciousness so that He appears as a limited and bound soul (paśu), even though ultimately He is still Śiva. Human beings exist as they understand themselves to be because Śiva can accomplish the impossible. This is so because, in actuality, there is nothing that is impossible for Śiva. There is only impossibility for lesser beings, or more accurately, modes of being, such as human beings, the pasus. On the level of Śiva, however, what will be impossible? In short, the answer is nothing. For everything is only the free expression of Śiva, as symbolized by Natarāja, one of the most popular images of Śiva, depicting Him doing His cosmic dance.

How is this possible though? Is Abhinava not trying to stride both sides of the metaphysical fence? How can Abhinava maintain that both the ultimate, as

\(^{139}\) IPV, vol.2, 141-142.
well as the limited, ordinary world are true and valid? If one affirms the reality of
the mundane world as real, as well as everything in it, does this not compromise
the infinitude of Śiva? How can He take on the flesh, blood, and mind of a human
being and still maintain the unblemished nature of that same God? How can the
same God accept the limitations of all of creation, and still proclaim the nature of
having perfect freedom? How can one completely affirm the mundane, and
completely affirm the highest of idealist metaphysics, while at the same affirming
the non-dual nature connecting the two. Is this idea of svātantra not just an ad
hoc effort on the part of Abhinava to have his cake and to eat it too?

Certainly, Abhinava is not able to answer all critiques with a thoroughly
logical and convincing rebuttal, and neither is that his ultimate intent, since his
works are first of all for the spiritual edification of his disciples. However, he
also does not leave the inquiring mind with nothing. It is through his
recontextualizing and recoding of everything within the scope of a single, real
consciousness, defined by its svātantra, that allows for him to address these
challenges.

For instead of focusing on a static and eternally pure consciousness,
Abhinava proclaims that Śiva is a dynamic reality due to its svātantra.
Furthermore, Abhinava affirms that knowledge and action are not really separate
from each other, but are connected and ultimately one. You cannot have one
without the other to have complete freedom. Once the individual realizes this,
that those powers are infinite, and that those powers are one’s own, he or she is
able to realize that Śiva is his or her own true Self. When this is realized, one
knows that all possibilities are contained within and due to their own svātantra, the svātantra of the Lord. This includes the possibility of Śiva creating the rock that even He cannot move.

All of this can be understood as revolving around, and made possible, by the concept of svātantra. Svātantra is what allows an unlimited God to become limited, which at the same time does not change the eternal nature of that God. It is svātantra that allows the ideals of the highest to be brought together with the mundane, every-day life without effacing the essential ideas of either one. Instead, in Abhinava’s understanding of reality all the possibilities are legitimate and real. The eternal bliss (ānanda) is affirmed, while the everyday ebb and tide of human emotions is still understood as valid. It is because of svātantra that we too, according to Abhinavagupta, can have our cake and eat it too.
Bibliography


Appendix: Sanskrit transliterations of translated passages from the IPV

Note 65, page 30; translation of vol.1, 54:

iyameva ca samvitsvabhāvatā

Note 66, page 30; translation of vol.1, 29:

sa bhagavān anavacchinnaprakāśānandarūpasvātantryaparamārtho

Note 67, page 31; translation of vol.1, 53:

sa cāyam svatantraḥ

Note 68, page 31; translation of vol.1, 144:

svātantryam aparādhānām pūrṇam mahadaiśvāryam
tanirmitabrahmaviṣṇurudrādyaiśvaryāpekṣayā ucyate. Tadevaṁ
cidvapuh’

Note 70, page 32 (also, note 86, page 40); translation of vol.1, 60:

kriyātmikāpi svātantryaprāṇā svātantryavyapagamād
asambhāvanābhūmireva

Note 71, page 32; translation of vol.1, 228:

yat samvit eva abhyupagatasyātantryā apratīghātatalaksanāt
icchāviśesavasāt samvido>nadhikātmatāyā anapāyāt
antaḥsthitameva sat bhāvajātam

Note 72, page 33; translation of vol.2, 42:

sa tu visuddhasvabhāvah śivātmā, māyāpade tu
saṃkucitasvabhāvaḥ paśuḥ

Note 76, page 35; translation of vol.2, 248 (one of Utpaladeva’s kārikās):

70
māyāśaktyaiva tattrayam

Note 86, page 40---see Note 70.

Note 89, page 41; translation of vol.1, 35 (quotation used by Abhinava):

prakāśasyātmavīrsāntirahambhāvo hi kṛtīta
uktā ca saiva viśrāntih sarvāpeksānirodhataḥ
svātantryamathā kartṛtvam sukhyamīśvaratāpi ca

Note 91, page 42; translation of vol.1, 29:

te tu yadiyaisvaryaviprudbhirīśvarībhūtāḥ

Note 92, page 42; translation of vol.1, 35 (quote from the Bhāskarī):

viśrāntih kā? “svātantryam”

Note 101, page 45; translation of vol.1, 423:

prakāśarūpatā jñānaṁ tatraiva svātantryātmā vimarsaṁ kriyā

Note 103, page 46; translation of vol.2, 248:

iha jñāṭkṛṭrrūpam āvaccittattvasya svarūpam

Note 105, page 46; translation of vol.2, 308:

evamiti, Īśvarāpurānātmānaṁ tasya ca svāvyatirikte
svātantryamātra rūpe jñānakriye jānan evambhūto>yamātmā

Note 106, page 47; translation of vol.2, 144:

yo hi jñānakriyāsvātantryayuktah sa Īśvara yathā
siddhāntapurānādiṣu prasiddhāḥ, tathā ca tvam—iti

Note 107, page 47; translation of vol.1, 343:
iti svamaśvaryameva sphutam pratyabhijñeyam “jānāti” “karoti”
cetiṇānakriyāsvātantryalakṣaṇam

Note 112, page 48; translation of vol.1, 164-165:

etadeva vedanādhikam veditṛtvam—vedanesu
samyojanaviyojanayoh yathāruci karanam svātantryam, kartṛtvam
cā etadeva ucyate

Note 113, page 49; translation of vol.1, 54:

karta jñātā ca maheśvara—ityabhidhāne>pi

Note 116, page 50; translation of vol.1, 53-54:

jñānapallavasvabhāvaiva hi kriyā—iti vakṣyate

Note 117, page 50; translation of vol.1, 423:

vimarśaśca antahkṛtaprakāśah

Note 118, page 50; translation of vol.1, 49-50:

yadi parinīstitasamvinmātrarūpena, tadā saṃvidām
bhedanam,bheditānām ca antaranasamdhānena abhedanam na syāt

Note 119, page 51; translation of vol.1, 53:

svātantryam ca asya abhede bhedanam, bhedite ca
antaranasamdhānena abhedanam—iti bahuprakāram vakyāmah

Note 127, page 55; translation of vol.1, 273:

sa ca prakāśo vimarśasāra iti

Note 132, page 58; translation of vol.2, 303-304:
nahi sah pratyagåtmå näma paśuḥ kaścidanyo yo>ham, api tu parigṛhitāgraḥyagrahakapraṇāśaikaḥghanah paro yaḥ sa evaḥham sa cāhameva, na tvanyah kaścit; ato vikalpasṛṣṭirapi ‘mama’ svātantryalaksano ‘vibhavah’

Note 134, page 59; translation of vol.1, 416:

yadā tu māyāśaktyā vichhedāvabhāsanāsvātantryarūpayā bāhyatvam eśām ābhāsyate

Note 136, page 60; translation of vol.1, 315-316:

tadapahastane tu parameśvarasya svātmaprācchādaṇeccaḥrupāḥ-bhedāprakāśanāṁ bhrāntirūpaṁ prati svātantryarūpa māyāśaktirhetuh

Note 137, page 60; translation of vol.2, 42:

sa ca svātantra ityapi nirnītam, sa tu viśuddhasvabhāvah śivātmā, māyāpade tu samkucitasvabhāvah paśuḥ

Note 139, page 62; translation of vol.2, 141-142:

iha parameśvarasyedameva param svātantryam—yat asmādṛkpracyapasūdāsāviṣeṣāsambhāvīyaṃnāti∂uṣka-ravastusampādānam nāma. itaśca kim atidūskaram—bhaviṣyati,--yatprakāśātmani akhanditādṛṣṭaye eva prakāśamāne prakāśananiṣedhāvabhāsah prakāśamānāh. tasmāt parameśvarasya tatparam svātantryam yat tathānavabhāsānam paśurūpātavabhāsānam nāma grāhakāmśasamutthāpanaṁ taddvāreṇa ca grāhīyollāsānamapi. saīṣa bhagavato māyāśaktirucyate. yathoktam:

‘māyā vimohini nāma…………….’

iti. tādevambhūtānmaiḥyāśaktirūpfat svātantryāt